"黑石法案"与私募基金征税之困惑

有限合伙制适应私募基金的多方面要求,也是美国私募基金的主流法律形式。本文梳理了有限合伙型私募基金的主要特征,分析了美国关于私募基金税收方面的制度安排,并在介绍美国黑石集团上市所引发的税收争论的基础上,提出在我国现行制度下对于新兴私募基金征税的相关策略。     

私人股权基金监管的国际经验及对中国的启示

英国对私人股权基金的监管基于两个层面,其一是机构投资者通过与私人股权基金经理签订一些保护自身利益的合约,对基金经理的投资行为进行约束与监管;其二是政策制定者通过制定一系列法律和法规,对私人股权市场进行规范。在中国,针对私人股权市场的专业监管主体还不明确,在很大程度上,私人股权市场的发展没有正式纳入政府的监管体系。中国应该设立一个专门机构或者增设一个职能部门对私人股权基金的发展予以监管;还应建立健全相关的法律法规。     

私营企业管理创新之管见

随着我国经济体制改革的深入,私营企业以其强大的生命力而不断发展壮大,现已成为推动国民经济发展的重要力量。私营企业必须创新管理机制,在企业内部管理上实现新的转变和突破。     

Corporate governance and private placement issuance in Australia

In this study, we examine the effectiveness of corporate governance in mitigating dilution in the economic and voting interests of existing nonparticipating (retail) shareholders in private placements. Based on a sample of 2420 private placements in Australia from 2001 to 2012, we find support for this proposition through the influence of corporate governance on pricing negotiation and firms’ choice of issuing method in private placements. Specifically, firms with better corporate governance offer private placements with a smaller discount, and are more likely to include a share purchase plan, which protects nonparticipating shareholders from ownership dilution in the placement.     

债券市场的评级信息能改善股票市场信息环境吗?——来自分析师预测的证据

本文研究发现,信用评级增加了分析师预测的公共信息,同时没有减少分析师预测的私有信息,即信用评级信息能够改善股票市场信息环境。具体地,本文利用2006-2016年上市公司数据实证发现,信用评级能显著提高分析师预测精度、降低分析师预测分歧度与乐观偏差,且这种效应在信息不对称程度高、低能力分析师跟踪的企业以及外资参股的评级机构中更加显著,这说明信用评级向分析师提供了新的信息。进一步地,信用评级只增加了分析师预测的公共信息,对私有信息没有显著影响,同时也不影响分析师的调研行为,上述结论表明信用评级信息披露并不影响分析师拥有私有信息的优势,且信用评级机构与分析师之间存在互补而非替代关系。因此,金融监管应该加强对评级机构尽职调研的要求,充分发挥信用评级机构的信息中介功能。     

民间借贷规范发展的路径选择探讨

民间借贷是目前满足资金融通的一种途径,在我国经济发展中起着越来越重要的作用.然而,民间借贷规范性的缺陷很大程度上影响了其作用的发挥.本文通过分析民间金融的问题,从推进民间借贷本身运作和推动与正规金融的联系两方面提出解决建议.     

Preferences or private assessments on a monetary policy committee?

Using Bank of England voting data, we show empirically that members’ votes are driven by heterogeneous individual assessments of the economy as well as their individual policy preferences. Estimates indicate that internal committee members form more precise assessments than externals and are also more hawkish. The estimates allow the first quantification of the gain due to information aggregation on monetary policy committees. The marginal gain from additional committee members tapers quickly after five members. There is no evidence of gains through externals’ moderating internals’ preferences. A relatively small committee of highly informed internal members emerges as a desirable committee structure.     

公私法接轨模式下无船承运业务的系统性监管

国际航运市场风险复杂性导致现行无船承运业务的监管模式无法应对无船承运业务中的新情况和新问题。各国的实践表明无船承运业务的监管制度具有由单一监管模式向多元监管模式嬗变的趋向。美国无船承运业务监管模式的成熟性具有其内在的因素,这些因素包括诸如成熟的航运系统环境、奉行＂保护与垄断＂的航运政策、施行动态和多元的监管模式以及＂公共承运人＂理念根深蒂固。基于国际海运无船承运业务监管的系统性特征的考量,在公私法接轨模式下,构建和完善一个以保证金制度的软化、多元的监管格局、强化保证责任以及承运人特定义务公法化为核心的系统性的监管模式是应对无船承运业务风险的可行方略。     

Cast Awayand the Contradictions of Product Placement

Abstract

This essay looks at implications of product placement in Cast Away, the 2000 film in which Tom Hanks plays a Federal Express executive who is stranded on a desert island before making his way back home. It argues that Cast Awayis a particularly valuable case study because of the conflict between its relentless product placement and its dark vision of contemporary global capitalism. The article investigates four aspects of global capitalism addressed by Cast Away: the compression of time, the compression of space, the rising influence of multinational corporations, and the dominance of consumer culture.     

Private Benefits of Control,Growth Opportunities and Investor Protection

We develop a model to illustrate that controlling shareholders choose the level of investor protection that maximizes their own interests. Controlling shareholders in companies with complicated control structures can easily extract private benefits and are thus reluctant to enhance investor protection which would necessitate increased transparency. In contrast, controlling shareholders in companies with valuable growth opportunities are willing to improve investor protection so that they can benefit from the increased value resulting from the lower cost of capital. We test this prediction using firm-level data in China. The results show that the level of investor protection increases with decreases in control structure opacity and increases in growth opportunities. The correlation is more significant for enforcement than for the mechanisms of investor protection.